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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY BASED ON A
MARKET SHARE THEORY: SINDELL v.
ABBOTT LABORA TORIES
I. INTRODUCTION
When California addressed the issue of strict products liability in
1963,1 it was an established principle of products liability that except in
rare cases, the plaintiff had to identify the defendant-manufacturer of
the product which caused his injuries to assert a cause of action.2 This
rule was followed in California as recently as 1978, when the court of
appeals in McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co. 3 affirmed the California Supe-
rior Court's grant of a summary judgment to a defendant-manufacturer
because the plaintiff could not identify the defendant as the specific
manufacturer of the drug which caused her injuries.
In March 1980, however, the California Supreme Court radically
departed from this requirement in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.4 The
court held that a valid cause of action was stated against five drug man-
ufacturers even though the particular manufacturer of the product
which caused injury could not be identified. In Sindell, the court pro-
nounced a new theory upon which non-identifiable manufacturer lia-
bility could be predicated. Under the court's new market share theory,
I. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff sustained injuries when a piece of wood flew out of the lathe he
was working with and hit him in the head. The defendant manufacturer argued that the plaintiff's
suit was barred because the plaintiff failed to give reasonable notice of a breach of warranty. The
court held that, regardless of the validity of the plaintiff's warranty action "[a] manufacturer
[could be] strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The effect of Greenman was to mitigate the
plaintiff's burden of proof in products liability actions. Strict products liability was subsequently
widely adopted by state and federal courts and incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of orts
§ 402,4. 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2d § 4:4 (1974).
2. It is clear that any holding that a producer, manufacturer, seller, or a person in a
similar position, is liable for injury caused by a particular product, must necessarily be
predicated upon proof that the product in question was one for whose condition the
defendant is in some way responsible. Thus, for example, if recovery is sought from a
manufacturer, it must be shown that he actually was the manufacturer of the product
which caused the injury ....
I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 1, § 1:41 at 125. Accord, W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTs § 103 at 671-72 (4th ed. 1971).
3. 89 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978).
4. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (appeal pending).
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plaintiffs injured by fungible products could bring suit against several
manufacturers, who together, produced a substantial portion of that
product. Each defendant would then be liable for the portion of the
judgment corresponding to their share of the market. 5
This note will examine the effect and the practicality of the market
share liability theory proposed by the court. The various policies un-
derlying traditional products liability law and the market share solu-
tion to the identity problem are also examined. Finally, the court's
decision will be analyzed and available alternatives to the market share
theory will be suggested.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The plaintiff, Judith Sindell, brought suit on her own behalf and
others similarly situated, against eleven drug companies and others for
injuries allegedly resulting from the ingestion of diethylstilbestrol
(DES)6 by their mothers while the plaintiffs were in utero. The defend-
ants were manufacturers who promoted, marketed, and distributed
DES between 1941 and 1971. In 1947, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage prevent-
ative on an experimental basis and required that it carry a warning
label to that effect.7 The drug was subsequently administered to the
plaintiffs' mothers. The drug was later found to be a possible cause of
adenocarcinoma, a rare uterine cancer, and adenosis, a precancerous
vaginal and cervical growth. These conditions appeared in daughters
5. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
6. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a man-made estrogen approved by the FDA in 1947 which
was administered to pregnant mothers to prevent miscarriage. For information on the studies
that supported this use, see Karnaky, The Use of Stilbestrolfor the Treatment of Threatened and
Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942), and
Smith, Diethystilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complications ofPregnancy, 56 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNEC. 821 (1948). But see Davis & Fugo, Steroids in the Treatment of Early Preg-
nancy Complications, 142 J.A.M.A. 778 (1950); Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does
the Administration of Diethylistilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OB-
STET. & GYNEc. 1062 (1953); Robinson & Shettles, The Use of Diethylstilbestrol in Threatened
Abortion, 63 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEc. 1330 (1952).
7. The FDA was not joined as a defendant even though it authorized the drug for use as a
miscarriage preventative. This is probably because of the exemption accorded injuries resulting
from discretionary agency function under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(1976). The original approval of the joint clinical file submitted by twelve companies to support
their request for new drug applications has been proposed as a basis for concert action. SeeComment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FOanHAM L. Ray. 963, 976
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Enterprise Liability].
1980]
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who were exposed to DES while in utero.8 In 1971, the FDA ordered
the defendants to cease marketing and promoting DES as a miscarriage
preventive. The FDA also ordered the defendants to warn physicians
and the public of the potential danger to unborn children if the drug
was used during pregnancy.9
The plaintiffs predicated their cause of action on various theories
of negligence, concert action, alternative liability, and strict products
liability.10 The defendants demurred on the ground that the plaintiffs
could not identify the manufacturer responsible for the product which
caused their injuries. The trial court sustained the demurrer based on
the plaintiffs' admission that they were unable to make the identifica-
tion. Consequently, the case was dismissed."
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling on
the appeal involving only five of the original eleven named defend-
ants."2 The court held that a valid cause of action was stated by proving
8. The exact increase in the incidence of adenocarcinoma is uncertain. Prior to the DES
outbreak, however, there were very few reported cases. See generally Unfelder, The Stilbestrol -
Adenosis - Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 CANCER 426 (1976). The frequency of incidents of adenosis
has prompted the FDA to require the following warning on forms of DES and related drugs still
on the market: "Vaginal adenosis has been reported in 30% to 90% of postpubertal girls and
young women whose mothers received diethylstilbestrol or a closely related congener during preg-
nancy .... The significance of this finding with respect to potential development of vaginal ade-
nocarcinoma is unknown. Periodic examination of such patients is recommended." 40 FED. REG.
32,773 (1975).
9. Responding to the dangers of DES, in 1971 the FDA took these three steps:
I. All manufacturers of DES or closely related congeners . . . are being notified
that appropriate changes will be required in the labeling for such drugs. This change
will consist in the listing of pregnancy as a contraindication to the use of diethylstilbes-
trol and other above-mentioned compounds.
2. All other estrogens will be required to have the following WARNING in their
labeling: "A statistically significant association has been reported between maternal in-
gestion during pregnancy of diethylstilbestrol and the occurrance of vaginal carcinoma
developing years later in the offspring. Whether such an association is applicable to all
estrogens is not known at this time. In any event, estrogens are not indicated for use
during pregnancy."
3. Epidemiological studies are being initiated to determine the true incidence of
this disease in young women.., and the probability of a cause and effect relationship.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION & U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
DRUG BULL., DIETHYLSTILBESTROL CONTRADINDCATED IN PREGNANCY (Nov. 1971).
10. The plaintiffs also brought causes of action based on violation of express and implied
warranties, false and fraudulent representation, mislabeling drugs in violation of federal law, con-
spiracy, and lack of consent. The court did not address these issues, and limited its discussion to
the theories of alternative liability, concert action, and industry-wide liability. See notes 15-96
infra and accompanying text.
11. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978), vacated 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (appeal pending).
12. The remaining defendants were Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R.
Squibb and Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26
Cal. 3d at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927 n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4.
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that the defendants produced a substantial percentage of DES. The
manufacturers were liable for a portion of the judgment equal to their
share of the market for that drug unless they could prove that they
could not have made the product which caused the plaintiffs' injuries.13
B. Issue Presented to the California Supreme Court
The issue, as stated by the court, was whether "a plaintiff, injured
as the result of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy,
who knows the type of drug involved but cannot identify the manufac-
turer of the precise product, [may] hold liable for her injuries a maker
of a drug produced from an identical formula?"' 4
III. NON-IDENTIFIABLE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY PRIOR TO
SINDELL V ABBOTT LABOATORIES
Strict products liability evolved as a device designed to aid the
consumer-plaintiff in surmounting obstacles of proof imposed by negli-
gence recovery theories when dealing with injuries caused by a defec-
tive product.'5 Strict products liability was justified on the grounds that
rapid technological progress had placed distance and complex technol-
ogy between the consumer and the manufacturer. The consumer was
perceived as inadequately prepared to protect himself from defective
and injurious products. Conversely, the manufacturer was in better po-
sition to prevent defective products from entering the marketplace.
Therefore, imposing liability on manufacturers for injuries caused by
defective products was deemed an incentive to product safety. The
manufacturer could also afford to bear the burden of the loss compared
to the injured consumer. The effect of the cost would be minimal be-
cause the manufacturer could pass it on to all his consumers as a cost of
doing business or he could insure against it. 6
Increased complexities in the marketplace spawned another prob-
13. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
14. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
15. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 96 & 97 at 641-58 (development of products
liability from the privity requirement through strict products liability); Gregory, Trespass to Negli-
gence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951); Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wilson, Prod-
ucts Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 614 (1955).
16. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 435, (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring), in which it was said: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." Id. at
462, 150 P.2d at 441. Accord, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736, 575 P.2d 1162,
1980]
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lem. Technological improvements and more efficient production prac-
tices allowed manufacturers to create and market fungible goods;
products which, though made by different manufacturers, could be in-
terchanged with one another. As a result, the injured consumer might
not be able to identify the particular manufacturer of the product
which caused his injuries. As the number of such cases increased, the
problem became more apparent. New theories emerged in an attempt
to accord the consumer some remedy when the manufacturer whose
product caused injury was not identifiable. Theories such as enterprise
liability'7 and non-legal systems such as latent technological injury
compensation were proposed.' 8 In addition, several established multi-
ple tortfeasor theories such as alternative liability, concert action, and
industry-wide liability were used to attack the problem. These theories
represent exceptions to the prevailing rule that the plaintiff must iden-
1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 380, 386 (1978); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts extends strict liability to the wholesaler and the retailer as
long as they are engaged in the business of selling the type of product involved in the particular
claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965). Courts have generally
held that liability may be imposed on the wholesaler regardless of whether the ultimate consumer
purchased the product directly from the wholesaler or through the retailer. Some courts, however,
refuse to impose liability on the wholesaler or retailer when they did not participate in the manu-
facturing process and when the wholesaler or retailer sold the product with a latent defect in the
same condition as it had been when it left the manufacturer. 1 R. HuRSH & H. BAILEY, supra
note 1, § 4:28. In addition, courts have shown some reluctance to impose liability on the retailer
of a product which has been packaged or sealed before it reaches the retailer. Id. § 4:29.
The possibility of holding a drug retailer liable for injuries caused by DES was addressed in
Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977). The court stated that pharmacists
could not be held strictly liable if they gave proper warning of dangerous ingredients or side
effects. Because the side effects of DES were unknown, even to the manufacturers, the pharmacist
could not be held liable. Unlike the manufacturer, the pharmacist did not have a duty to test the
product for side effects. Id. at -, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
The reported class action suits involving DES manufacturers have not included reatilers and
wholesalers as defendants. Limitations on the liability of these parties may be one reason. Tacti-
cal considerations such as the solvency of the retailer or wholesaler and the effort to avoid circu-
tious litigation may also be influential. Future application of the market share theory will
probably not involve these parties because the problems inherent in the theory would make appli-
cation to these groups impractical. With thousands of wholesaler and retailers it would be even
more difficult to determine what share of the market each party was responsible for. In addition,
the amount of time and money that would be needed to join a sufficient portion of these groups
would be prohibitive. Even if the market share theory could be limited geographically with re-
spect to wholesalers and retailers, the inability of these groups to pay the large damage awards
imposed and the minimal effect that imposing liability on these parties would have on the total
industry would make such lawsuits unprofitable. Therefore, it is understandable that the whole-
salers and retailers have not been joined in Sindell-type suits.
17. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 995-1000.
18. Note, Industry- Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REv. 980, 1015-22 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Industry-Wiqde Liability]. Cf. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective
No-Fault Insurancefor Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1976) (suggesting no-fault
insurance for medical malpractice and products liability).
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tify the manufacturer whose product caused the injuries in question. 9
A. Alternative Liability
Where two or more tortfeasors are negligent toward the plaintiff
and it is not known which defendant caused the harm, all tortfeasors
will be held jointly and severally liable under the theory of alternative
liability. This theory was introduced in Summers v. Tice in which a
plaintiff was injured when two of the hunters he was with negligently
fired their guns.2" The court held that once the plaintiff proved that the
defendants were negligent and that the negligence caused the plaintiffs
injury, the burden of proof as to causation shifted to the defendants. It
then became incumbent upon the defendants to absolve themselves of
liability.2' Under Summers, each defendant was liable for the whole
amount of the damages with apportionment to be decided among
them. 2 Alternative liability was developed to avoid the unfairness of
allowing the defendants to escape liability because the plaintiff was not
able to prove which defendant caused his injury when it was certain
that one person was responsible.23 It was especially justified in situa-
tions in which the defendants were more capable of producing evidence
as to the cause of the injury than the plaintiff.24
As the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes, this rule is usually
applied when all possible defendants have been joined.25 In a products
19. E.g., Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 868, 873-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848-50
(1978); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 1, § 1:41.
This requirement is a major obstacle in DES cases because of the passage of time, and be-
cause the formulae used by the manufacturers to produce DES were identical. The effect was to
preclude the plaintiffs and the defendants from producing evidence on the identification issue.
Consequently, all but two DES cases were dismissed. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 15600-
1974 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979), aft'd, (A.D. 1st Dept. N.Y. Feb. 24, 1981). Butsee, Gray v. U.S., 455 F.
Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly and Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 733, 150 Cal. Rptr.
730 (1978).
20. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
21. Id. at -, 199 P.2d at 4. The Summers court justified this shift by citing Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1945), in which the court allowed the burden of proof on
causation to shift to the defendants once the plaintiffprovided enough evidence to infer negligence
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
22. 33 Cal. 2d at -, 199 P.2d at 5.
23. Id. at-, 199 P.2d at 3.
24. Id. at-, 199 P.2d at 4.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B, Comment h (1965). Subsection (3) to
§ 433(B) provides that:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been
caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has
caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(3) (1965).
1980]
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liability action involving a number of manufacturers it might not be
possible to join all the defendants.16 One case similar to Sindell in
which the court used alternative liability to reverse the lower court's
granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment was Abel v.
Eli Lilly and Co .27 The plaintiffs in Abel were also daughters whose
mothers used DES during pregnancy. The plaintiffs brought a prod-
ucts liability action against defendants who allegedly comprised a
group of all the manufacturers of DES whose products were sold in
Michigan during the relevant time period.28 The court held that a
cause of action was stated under several theories, including alternative
liability.2
9
The defendants' main argument was that the plaintiffs could not
identify the manufacturer of the product which caused their injuries.30
The majority and the dissent both agreed that identification of the
manufacturer was usually a requirement in a products liability case. 31
The majority, however, did not view the action as an issue of identifica-
tion, but as a question of the apportionment of damages.32 Therefore,
once the plaintiff proved that the defendants had caused them to suffer
a certain amount of damage, the burden of proof as to the apportion-
ment of the damages shifted to the defendants.33 The court, however,
26. Generally, in personam jurisdiction would not be a problem because most states have
long-arm statutes. See Sutterfield, In Personam Jurisdiction-How Long Is the 'Zong Arm" in
Products Liability?, 1980 INs. L. J. 447-60. It is possible, however, that some companies which
produced DES in the 1950's and 1960's are no longer in existence and therefore cannot be joined.
27. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d (1980).
28. Id. at 68, 289 N.W.2d at 23. "Defendants' motion was supported by affidavits which
stated that more than 300 manufacturers were listed ... as offering DES for sale at the relevant
time." Id.
29. Id. at 71-72, 289 N.W.2d at 24. Plaintiffs alleged that all defendants acted wrongfully in
producing and marketing a defective product, and that each plaintiffwas injured by the product of
one of the defendants. They also alleged that all defendants acted wrongfully, and one (but only
one) of the defendants caused the harm to each individual plaintiff, therefore, they are alterna-
tively liable. Plaintiffs also alleged that all defendants, acting in concert, caused the marketing of
DES, and that this concerted activity was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. All defendants,
having acted together to cause all the harm, are therefore jointly and severally liable, Id. See
note 43 infra and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 68, 289 N.W.2d at 23.
31. Id. at 70, 85, 289 N.W.2d at 24, 30-31. Both also agree that adopting a new theory of
enterprise liability is not recommended. Id. at 77, 91, 289 N.W.2d at 27, 33.
32. "In the case before us. . .the problem is essentially one of apportionment of damages
among proven wrongdoers." Id. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26. The court, however, never addressed
the issue of identification. It appears that it accepted the plaintiffs' allegation that joining all
manufacturers which sold DES in Michigan during the relevant time satisfied the Summers re-
quirement that the plaintiffjoin all possible defendants. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, -, 199
P.2d 1, 3 (1948).
33. To establish the alternative liability of the defendants, the plaintiff would have to "estab-
lish by the preponderance of the evidence that each defendant breached its duty of care in produc-
7
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did not address the fact that though the defendants, through affidavits,
were able to show that of more than 300 companies manufacturing
DES at the relevant time, the plaintiffs had joined only those who had
sold DES in Michigan.34
The court's holding could produce unfair results for both prospec-
tive defendants and prospective plaintiffs. On one hand, with fewer
than the total number of possible defendants present, manufacturers
whose product may not have caused the injury may be held liable.35
Conversely, if it is assumed that all the plaintiffs' mothers ingested the
DES while in Michigan, the plaintiffs could argue that joinder of all
manufacturers selling DES within the state at the time minimizes the
chance that a manufacturer outside the defendants group would have
supplied the drug.36 The defendant's predicament becomes more ap-
parent, though, if the plaintiffs are not able to satisfy their burden of
proof as to some of the defendants. 7 In that event, the risk of an inno-
cent manufacturer being held liable is greater. From the plaintiffs' per-
spective though, all DES manufacturers were tortfeasors because they
all marketed a defective product. The question remains one of causa-
tion and there are strong policy considerations which would dictate
that as between a manufacturer who may have caused the injury, and a
completely innocent plaintiff, the manufacturer should bear the loss.3"
Regarding causation, the plaintiffs bear what the court recognized
as an extreme heavy burden of proof. The plaintiffs must prove that
one or more of the defendants manufactured the DES ingested by the
mothers involved.39 If the plaintiffs fail to prove that it was more prob-
able than not that any one particular defendant manufactured the in-
jury causing DES, they would lose as to that defendant. The plaintiffs
would lose as to all defendants, if they could not sustain this burden
ig the product, that the harm to each plaintiff was the result of ingestion of DES by her mother,
and that one or more of the named defendants manufactured DES so ingested." 94 Mich. App. at
76-77, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
34. Id. at 68, 289 N.W.2d at 23.
35. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 991.
36. The author points out in Enterprise Liability that one of the main characteristics of the
alternative liability theory was the joinder of every party possibly responsible for the plaintiff's
injuries. This created a presumption of causation that varied the standard of proof. Therefore,
even though the possibility that one particular defendant was responsible was fifty percent or less,
it was counterbalanced by the certainty that one of the defendants did in fact cause the injury. To
join less than all possible defendants would destroy this balance. Id. at 986, 991.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, -, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (1948); Enterprise Liability, supra note 7,
at 99 1.
39. 94 Mich. App. at 76-77, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27. See note 33 supra.
1980]
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toward any of them. It is very possible that the plaintiffs would be
denied a remedy.40
As evidenced, alternative liability as a possible solution to the
identification issue in products liability cases involving multiple de-
fendants is not without its problems. The inherent risk of unfairness to
the defendants must be carefully balanced against the risk of leaving
the plaintiffs without a remedy. There appears to be a general agree-
ment that, without modification, alternative liability is inapplicable to
cases such as Sindell.41
B. Concert Action
The theory of concert action has also been used to shift the burden
of proof on the causation issue from the plaintiff to the defendant. 42
The plaintiff must show that the defendants acted pursuant to a com-
mon design, gave substantial encouragement or assistance to another's
wrongful conduct, or, acted wrongfully themselves in giving aid to an-
other's wrongful conduct.43 In this regard, agreement may be tacit or
express. The purpose behind the theory is to deter harmful group ac-
tivity.44
The application of the theory to a products liability situation was
examined in Hall v. EZ Du Pont De Nemours & Co. ,45 under the con-
40. Market share would be a possible means of proving that it was more likely than not that
the particular defendant manufactured the DES which injured the plaintiff. Since each plaintiff
has to prove this as to each defendant, if the market share of each defendant was small, the
plaintiffs would probably lose since potential liability is more difficult to prove. Id. at 76-77, 289
N.W.2d at 26-27.
41. Enterprise Liabiliy, supra note 7, at 990-91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B(3), Comment h, at 446 (1965).
42. The theory originated to handle cases of group assault. E.g., Sir John Heydon's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613) and cases cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 46 at 291 n.5. The modem
application of the theory has generally been in cases involving car races which result in injury.
Eg. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Lemons v. Kelly, 293 Or. 354, 397 P.2d 784
(1964).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965), provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he
a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with
him, or
b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Id.
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 43 at 292.
45. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 371 (1972); Hanrahan v.
Cochran, 12 A.D. 91, 42 N.Y.S. 1031 (1896); Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 979.
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cept ofjoint control of risk.46 The plaintiff could prove joint control by
the following methods: (1) by showing that there existed an explicit
agreement among the defendants with regard to warnings and other
safety features; (2) by showing covert joint action through evidence of
parallel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit agreement;
and, (3) by showing that the defendants adhered to an industry-wide
safety standard. The court labeled the first method classic concert of
action. Noting that the theory was not limited to any particular mode
of cooperation or negligence,47 the court found that the plaintiff's alle-
gations concerning the defendants' knowledge of the blasting caps risk,
the feasibility of safety measures, and the cooperation among the de-
fendants, stated a valid cause of action under this theory.48 The critical
factor would be proof that the knowledge of the risks and the safety
measures used were shared by the members of the industry and used as
a basis for joint decisions.49
Concert action was examined in relation to the DES situation in
Abel v. Eli Lily and Co .s0 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
acted in concert to produce and market a defective product without
46. 345 F. Supp. at 371. Recognizing that joint control of risk could arise through business
relations or joint enterprise, the court rejected the argument that some form of profit sharing was a
requirement in order to impose liability. Id. at 372-73.
47. The court referred to Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), as illustrative of the application of the concert action theory in a strict
liability case involving manufactured products. The court in Vandermark extended the cause of
action to the retailer on the grounds that he was an integral part of the overall processing system.
Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. Extending liability to the retailer who may be in a
position to exert some influence over the safety of the product would be an additional incentive to
safety. Finally, the retailer may be the only party available to the plaintiff. To impose liability on
him would not be unfair because it would avoid leaving the plaintiff without a remedy and the
retailer could adjust the cost among the other members of the industry, and the consumers as a
part of doing business. Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960), involved a negli-
gence action for injuries sustained while plaintiff was working with explosives containing three
component parts. The court, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, imposed joint liability even
though each defendant had exclusive control over only one component part. Id. at 82. The court
justified its decision by emphasizing that all parts were in the control of the defendants at the stage
in which care was needed, that the plaintiff should not be barred from recovery due to impossible
procedural barriers, and, finally, that the possibility of cost spreading reduced unfairness to the
defendants. Id. at 81-83.
48. 345 F. Supp. at 375.
49. The court noted the following factors as being relevant in this regard: 1) size and compo-
sition of the trade association's membership; 2) its announced and actual safety objectives; 3) its
method of decision making in this area; 4) the manner in which accident information was col-
lected; 5) the safety program and its implementation by the association and its members during
the relevant time period. Id. at 376.
50. 94 Mich. App. at 72-73, 289 N.W.2d at 24-25. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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adequate testing or warning.5' This case, unlike Hall, did not involve a
trade association. Nevertheless, the court found that these allegations
stated a valid cause of action. Even if it was shown that one defendant
did not act wrongfully toward the plaintiff, the rest may be held jointly
and severally liable. Proof that one of the defendants was the manufac-
turer of the defective product would not absolve the others because the
basis of the theory is that all defendants, by their cooperative acts, con-
tributed to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.5 2
The main problem with the application of concert action to DES
cases is the difficulty of proving cooperative action without evidence of
an express agreement. Arguably, courts should infer the existence of a
tacit agreement when there is evidence of intentionally synchronized
behavior which is part of an overall industry plan which benefits the
participants.53 Such parallel behavior though, may be attributable to
factors other than tacit agreement. The role of regulations, especially
in the drug industry, may explain the cooperation among industry
members. To impose liability based on compelled behavior would pe-
nalize the industry for complying with regulations designed to protect
the public. This would hardly serve the safety incentive rationale un-
derlying products liability law.54
As in alternative liability, the imposition of joint liability under
concert action may lead to arbitrary selection of defendants and unfair
standards of liability when all possible defendants are not joined.--
This possibility can be mitigated a number of ways. First, the defend-
ants may implead other manufacturers who they feel are responsible.
Second, unlike alternative liability, concert action does not require the
joinder of all possible defendants because each defendant has contrib-
uted to the harm and therefore is jointly and severally liable.5 6 Finally,
if the plaintiffjoins those defendants who contributed to the major por-
tion of the market, it is not only likely that one of them would be the
party responsible for the injuries, but it is likely that as a group, those
defendants greatly influenced the entire industry.57 Therefore, imposi-
51. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
52. Id.
53. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 983.
54. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
55. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 984.
56. See generally Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 429-30
(1937).
57. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 985.
[Vol. 16:286
11
Redemann: Manufacturers' Liability Based on a Market Share Theory: Sindell
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
8SINDELL v. ABBOTT LABORA4TORIES
tion of liability would encourage them to direct the industry towards
insuring greater product safety.
Concert action is one possible way to approach the causation issue
in DES and similar actions. The primary difficulty lies in proving the
existence of a tacit agreement among the members of the industry.
This task is complicated by the infusion of government regulations re-
stricting industry activity.
C. Industry- Wide Liability
A third theory, industry-wide liability, has been proposed as a
method for dealing with the problem in multiple defendant lawsuits by
eliminating the identification requirement. This theory was clearly
pronounced in Hall v. EL Du Pont De Nemours & Co."
In Hall the plaintiffs were children who were injured when blast-
ing caps exploded. The incidents took place over a four year period
and involved twelve separate accidents in ten different states. The
plaintiffs were unable to identify the manufacturer because the explo-
sions destroyed any identifying marks on the blasting caps. The de-
fendants, six blasting cap companies and their trade association,
constituted the entire blasting cap industry in the United States.5 9
In deciding whether the defendants' parallel safety practices could
provide a basis for joint liability, the court noted that joint liability was
concerned with three problems. The first was the need to deter hazard-
ous group activity. The second was the task of imposing foreseeable
losses to those parties in the best position to guard against them. The
third problem concerned allocating the burden of proof so as to avoid
58. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
59. Hall is consolidation of two cases, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp.
358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), and Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., No. 70-C-I 107 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) which were both decided as to the tort issues of product liability in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Chance, however, moved for a severance of
his case on the grounds of improper joinder of parties and also moved for a transfer of jurisdic-
tions. Decision on the question was reserved pending an evidentiary hearing on which law should
govern the substantive issues in the case. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. at
380-81; Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 57 F.R.D. 165, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Ulti-
mately it was decided that law to be applied was not that of New York but that of the respective
jurisdictions in which the accidents occurred. Accordingly, the claim of Chance was subsequently
transferred. Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439, 445-48 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
It should be noted that in Hall, the manufacturer who actually produced the damaging blast-
ing cap was known. In Chance, the manufacturer was unknown. The discussion of the Hall case
pertains to that case which consolidated the parties, Le., 345 F. Supp. 353. The theories discussed
refer to the allegations and arguments with respect to the court's disposition of the product liabil-
ity issues raised in Chance's claim.
1980]
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denying the injured plaintiff a remedy merely because proof of causa-
tion was either within the defendants' control, or totally unavailable.60
To deal with these problems, the court proposed a theory of in-
dustry-wide liability based primarily on concert action. Under this the-
ory, the plaintiffs can shift the burden of proof on causation to the
defendants if they can show: (1) that all the manufacturers of a product
adhered to an insufficient uniform safety standard; (2) that they cooper-
ated in the design and manufacture of the product; (3) that the product
was defective and caused plaintiff's injury; (4) and that one of the de-
fendants manufactured the product in question.6' The plaintiffs' ability
to shift the burden of proof would not be affected by the fact that the
blasting caps may have come from outside the United States. 62
This theory incorporated the concert action principle, recognizing
that although the actual harm to the plaintiff was caused in fact by one
defendant, it was the conduct of the group as a whole, in devising insuf-
ficient safety standards, that caused the harm.63 Since the defendants
were responsible for the inadequate safety practices, holding the group
jointly and severally liable was perceived to be the most practical rem-
edy and placed the burden of what the court deemed the inevitable
costs of business on those in the best position to take precautions
against further injuries.'
To benefit from the shift of evidentiary burdens, the plaintiff had
to initially prove that the defendants had breached a duty of care to-
ward them and that there was a causal connection between the group
created risk and their injuries. The plaintiffs' burden was satisfied if
they proved that it was more probable than not that the injury causing
caps were the product of one of the named defendants. Though the
shift of evidentiary burdens was a product of alternative rather than
concert liability, the court found that the justification of avoiding an
60. 345 F. Supp. at 371.
61. Id. at 380. The court justified the shift using the rationale behind the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment f (1965):
[T]he injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers,-who among them have inflicted an in-
jury upon an entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of
their conduct and the resulting harm was made it difficult or impossible to prove which
of them has caused the injury. Id.
62. 345 F. Supp. at 379. Shifting the burden of proof effectively established liability unless
the defendants proved that they did not manufacture the blasting caps in question. This was an
insurmountable burdtn because all identifying marks were destroyed when the caps exploded.
63. Id. at 374.
64. Id. at 377-78.
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unjust result served both theories.65
This theory has been criticized for the court's apparent failure to
recognize the problem created by allowing cause-in-fact to be gauged
on a standard of probability.66 Arguably though, the court implicitly
recognized this problem by placing the emphasis on the group's activi-
ties rather than the activity of each individual member. Under the con-
cert action theory, the fact that one defendant's conduct can be proved
to be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injuries does not relieve the
others of liability.67 In Hall, the harm was not caused by the failure of
the individual members to place adequate warnings on their blasting
caps, or by the failure to make the caps more difficult to detonate, but
by the manufacturers mutual agreement as to the relevant safety stan-
dards.68 The court in Hall was careful to distinguish its holding, which
is predicated on industry safety standard agreements reached in a small
concentrated industry, from the case of similar agreements reached in
larger decentralized industries.69 In the latter instance, proving that the
entire industry agreed and adhered to uniform safety standards would
be much more difficult. Accordingly, the basis on which liabilty would
rest would be insufficient.
D. Enterprise Liability
The theory of enterprise liability was proposed to deal with the
particular problems of a DES suit. The plaintiff must prove that the
defendants all manufactured a generically similar defective product
and that the product's defect caused the plaintiffs injury. The plaintiff
65. Id. at 379 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment f (1965) and
Wigmore, Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without
Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923)).
66. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 998. Cause-in-fact is the necessary occurrance with-
out which the plaintiff would not have suffered an injury. The question involved is whether the
conduct of the defendant caused the plaintiff's harm. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41 at 237. If the
particular manufacturer is not known, the relationship between a defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's injury cannot be determined.
67. 345 F. Supp. at 372, 378.
68. Id. at 375-76.
69. The court noted:
To establish that the explosives industry should be held jointly liable on [industry-wide]
liability grounds, plaintiffs... will have to demonstrate defendants'Joint awareness of
the risks at issue... and their joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. By noting
these requirements we wish to emphasize their special applicability to industries com-
posed of a small number of units. What would be fair and feasible with regard to an
industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decen-
tralized industry composed of thousands of small producers.
Id. at 378. (emphasis added)
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must also prove that there was an insufficient, industry-wide safety
standard as to the manufacture of this product and there must be clear
and convincing evidence that one of the defendant's products caused
the plaintiff's injuries. In addition, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendants owed a duty to a class of which the plaintiff is a member.
Finally, the plaintiffs inability to identify the manufacturer can not be
due to his fault. Once these elements are established, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendants. To avoid liability it is incumbent on the
defendants to prove that they could not have manufactured the product
which caused the plaintiffs injuries.70
The enterprise liability theory combines principles of alternative
and concert liability. It is similar to alternative liability in that it re-
quires the product of one defendant to be the cause-in-fact of the plain-
tiff's injuries. Accordingly, a defendant who adhered to the insufficient
industry-wide safety standard may escape liability if it can prove that
its product did not cause the injuries.7 1 Furthermore, both theories
cure the plaintiffs inability to identify the manufacturer by shifting the
burden of proof on causation to the defendants. 72 Enterprise liability
differs from alternative liability in that all possible defendants do not
have to be joined in order for causation to be established. 73 The plain-
tiff need only show by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the
manufacturers, all of whom are tortfeasors, manufactured the product
which caused his injury. The clear and convincing standard can be met
by joining manufacturers whose combined production equals seventy-
five percent to eighty percent of the total market. 74 Though alternative
liability places responsibility for the total amount of damages on each
defendant,75 under enterprise liability the defendants would be liable
70. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 995.
71. Id. at 996. The ability of the defendants to exonerate themselves has been criticized as a
hollow concession, particularly in DES cases where the lack of proof is due to time rather than the
defendants' negligence. The defendants would not have any more information than would the
plaintiffs. Therefore it would be unlikely that they could prove that they did not manufacture the
injury-causing product. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1000-01. Furthermore, enter-
prise liability, like industry-wide liability, retains the insufficient safety standard as a basis for
liability for those defendants who cannot prove causation. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at
997.
72. Enterprise Liablity, supra note 7, at 996. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B,
Comment f (1965).
73. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
74. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 996. The author notes that this requirement dilutes
the Summers rule but justifies it by pointing out that under enterprise liability, the plaintiff must
prove the added element of an industry-wide safety standard ahered to by the defendants, Id. at
997.
75. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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only for the amount equivalent to their market share.7 6
Enterprise liability incorporates the concert liability principles by
requiring proof of an industry-wide safety standard and the manufac-
ture of a generically similar defective product, both which must con-
tribute to the plaintiff's injuries.7 It differs from concert liability in
that it does not require any type of express or implicit agreement. Par-
allel behavior is sufficient in and of itself.78
Under enterprise liability, traditional tort policies would be served
by placing the loss on the tortfeasor rather than the injured plaintiff.
More importantly, however, it aligns legal principles with changes in
technology and society by placing the loss on the manufacturer who is
best able to absorb and distribute the cost and take preventive meas-
ures.
7 9
Although the enterprise liability theory attempts to base liability
on two recognized theories of joint liability, it has been criticized as
deviating too greatly from traditional tort principles and policies be-
cause it eliminates the identification requirement.8" Although it was
proposed to meet the needs of DES cases in particular,8' enterprise lia-
bility would have application to other situations as well.82 Ultimately,
its potential effect on manufacturing in general would be significant.
The effect of extended products liability has already been felt in in-
creased premiums. Under the enterprise liability theory, increased po-
tential for liability might place the cost of premiums outside the reach
of small manufacturers.83 While the increased liability may provide an
76. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 1000.
77. Id. at 996.
78. Id. Cf. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (1972) (the court
stated that whether defendants shared knowledge of known risks and joint decisions based on this
knowledge were critical facts to be proved).
79. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 1000-02. The author points out that the insurance
system, especially for drug companies, is undergoing change. Some companies have already be-
come insurers. The imposition of enterprise liability may encourage this trend and result in a
more economic and efficient system. Id. at 1003-04. Furthermore, rather than discouraging small
industries, the theory supports them by focusing on the large manufacturers. Id. at 1005.
80. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 998.
81. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 994.
82. Areas in which enterprise liability would be applicable would be injuries caused by ge-
neric drugs other than DES, cigarette smoking, pesticides, air pollution, water pollution, food
preservatives, and asbestos-any product which is discovered to have harmful effects over a long
period of time. Industry- Wide Liability, supra note 18 at 1002 n. 114. The theory has already been
used in asbestos cases. Letter from Robert B. Steinberg (counsel for plaintiffs in Hogard v. Johns-
Manville Corp., No. C-137466 (L.A.S.C. 1980) (appeal pending)) to the author of the current
article (June 26, 1980). As of that date, Mr. Steinberg reported that over 1,000 asbestos lawsuits
had been filed in the Southern California area since 1975.
83. In a survey done for congressional hearings on the insurance problem, the fifty-four firms
1980]
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incentive for greater product safety, it might also decrease it because no
matter how safe one manufacturer tries to make its product, it may be
found liable for another's error. In addition, research and marketing of
new products may be inhibited, contrary to the societal interest in en-
couraging production of new, beneficial products. Finally, because the
theory concentrates on large manufacturers, they may be encouraged to
organize the industry and effectively shut down smaller manufacturers
in violation of anti-trust laws.84
Policy considerations also militate against acceptance of enterprise
liability. The reason behind the shift of the burden of proof on causa-
tion is to achieve a more equitable result.8 5 But equity extends consid-
erations to both the plaintiff and the defendant. The mere possibility
that a particular defendant might be responsible should not be a fair
basis for liability. 6 No doubt the possibility equally exists that the de-
fendant's product was not responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The
theory may also be unfair to plaintiffs who identify the manufacturer
but must accept the consequences of a defendant's insolvency or un-
availability. In this instance, the plaintiff who cannot identify the man-
ufacturer but can pick solvent and available defendants is in a better
position.8
7
The policy of loss spreading which supports this theory has been
criticized as undermining the whole body of tort law. 88 Fault in some
responding reported that the average products liability premium increase between 1970-76 was
944.6% while average increase in sales was only 162.1%. The survey showed that 21.6% of the
firms responding wanted products liability insurance but were unable to obtain it. Product Liabil.
it, Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment, andBusiness Opportunities
of the House Committee on Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 15 (1977).
It was concluded that the problem was affordability, not availability. BIUEPINO REPORT:
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILiTY, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 437, 438 (1977). It was
later noted, however, that unaffordability was tantamount to unavailability. H.R. REP. No. 95-
997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978). In both cases, the result appears to be that small firms were
not able to bear the risks of operation.
84. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1003-05.
85. Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (1972); Summers v. Tice,
33 Cal. 2d 80, -, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, -, 154 P.2d 687, 691
(1944). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment f (1965).
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41 at 241.
87. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1009-10. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588,
618, 607 P.2d 924, 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 149 (1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
88, To allow loss spreading covertly to dominate the structure of tort law will only pro-
duce unsound results and bad general principles, it will only bring the law into disrepute
as the courts say one thing and do yet another;, it will only call into question the solid
achievements of traditional tort law, as they are overshadowed by current excesses injudicial doctrine; and it will so overburden the tort system that it will destroy its effec-
tiveness in situations in which it has worked well in the past.
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REv. 643, 661 (1978).
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form is still the basis of liability. 9 Enterprise liability, however, would,
in effect, eliminate that basis and result in making manufacturers insur-
ers. In addition, the deterrent aspects of products liability law would
be defeated by holding a manufacturer liable for a defect that could
not have been discovered at the time the product was marketed. With-
out fault as a basis, liability would be imposed based on injury alone.9°
The denial of compensation should not raise a presumption of injustice
because the question is not only one of compensation but of legiti-
macy.9
1
E. Latent Technological Injury Compensation
The arguments against enterprise liability generally lead to the
conclusion that the problem of non-identifiable manufacturers exceeds
the court's ability to fashion a practical remedy.92 Since any solution to
this problem will have effects not only on the substantive legal issues,
but on industrial and the economic, concerns it is an appropriate ques-
tion for legislation.93 One alternative proposed would be a system for
89. The role of fault in products liability, especially strict products liability, is currently in
question. Though originally seen as eliminating fault, strict products liability has retained some
of the fault concept in the unreasonably dangerous standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 75 at 494-96. The California Supreme Court rejected
this standard as being too close to a negligence standard in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). However, in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 775, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), the California Supreme Court defined fault as
including both negligence and strict liability. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
The court then held that comparative fault applied to strict products liability.
For an analysis of the conflict between fault-based and no-fault strict products liability in
California, see generally Comment, 4 California Perspective in Strict Products Liability, 9 PAC.
LJ. 755 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Calfornia Perspective].
Drugs are an anomaly in the law of strict products liability because while it is recognized that
there is always some attendant risk, that risk is generally outweighed by the social benefit. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965). The result is that, the negligence
standard still applies to drugs in a strict products liability case. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at
967 n.18.
90. See Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1013-15.
91. Epstein, supra note 88, at 645. See Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 91, 289
N.W.2d 20, 33 (1980) (Moore, J., dissenting).
92. See generally Industry- Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1015 n. 191.
93. On October 31, 1979, the Department of Commerce published the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act. 44 FED. REG. 62,714. The purpose of the Act was to balance the interests of
product users and sellers and to promote more certainty within the system. Id. at 62,716. The Act
provided for a ten-year statute of repose which gave a product a ten-year useful life after delivery.
Id. at 62,732. It also allowed a two-year statute of limitation which would run from the time the
claimant discovered or should have discovered or could have discovered the harm and its cause.
Id. The drug industry is exempted from these limitations under section 110(B)(2)(d). See id. One
commentator noted that the effect of this exemption would be to expose drug firms to greater
liability than they have under common law or most state statutes. Buchanan, Product Liability
Defenses Under the Model Unform Product LiabilityAct and State Legislation, 15 FORUM 813, 817
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"latent technological injury compensation." This system would be a
governmental branch which would get the necessary operational funds
through a tax on manufacturers' gross sales. The fund would be avail-
able to both plaintiffs who could identify the manufacturer and those
who could not. Under this system, the statute of limitations would start
to run from the date of purchase. Once the statute has run, tort litiga-
tion would no longer be an option. The plaintiff would have to apply
to an administrative agency to get relief. Recovery would be based on
the plaintiffs ability to show that he was injured, that the injury could
be traced to a type of product, and that the injury could not have been
discovered prior to the running of the statute. The plaintiff could re-
cover damages for bodily injury and lost earnings according to a fixed
scale. Pain and suffering would not be compensable. The government
agency though would be allowed to seek indemnity from the manufac-
turer on the basis of fault.94
This alternative would more readily satisfy the current societal
concern for compensating victims without doing violence to traditional
tort law. It also provides a solution to a problem which will occur with
increasing frequency as increased technology leads to injuries which
require, and, deserve compensation. In addition, the goal of loss
spreading is served, especially since the loss is spread among those
whose activity generated the harm.95
This solution though, requires legislative action which is often te-
dious and compromising. Also required is the creation of an adminis-
trative agency. With the prevailing public opinion and political climate
against government expansion, this may not be easily accomplished.
Furthermore, the system requires a tax on the gross sales of manufac-
(1980). The Act though, does not adequately address the problem of non-identification of the
manufacturer.
94. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1019-21. The theory would apply to the DES
situation as follows. Assume that there is a ten-year statute of limitations and that plaintiff's
mother ingested the DES in 1955. Because the statute starts to run from the date cfjurchase, in
this case, the date of ingestion, the plaintiff's cause of action in tort would expire in 1965. If the
plaintiff discovered her injury prior to 1965, her remedy would be to sue the manufacturer in a
regular tort action. She could not recover through the administrative agency because her injury
was discoverable prior to the running of the statute. If her suit was successful, the plaintiff could
recover actual and special damages, including pain and suffering. If the plaintiff's injury was not
discovered until after 1965, she would have to apply to the administrative agency to get relief.
Tort litigation would not be an option because the statute had expired. The plaintiff's recovery
would be limited to actual damages and lost earnings. Pain and suffering would not be compensa-
ble.
95. Id. at 1020-21.
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turers.96 Unless the economic benefit to the manufacturers in terms of
lower damage awards and legal fees is clearly demonstrable, manufac-
turers would no doubt lobby strongly against such a plan. Finally, the
limitations on damages might make the plan unappealing to plaintiffs
who, under tort law, might be able to recover not only actual and spe-
cial damages, but punitive damages as well. Though the system is ap-
pealing in its simplicity and rationale, it would have to overcome major
obstacles before it would be realized.
As evidenced, the problem posed by fungible products and the
problem of a plaintiffs inability to identify the manufacturer has been
considered from many angles. Traditional tort theories such as alterna-
tive liability, concert action, and industry-wide liability have limita-
tions which render them inapplicable in this situation. New theories
based on modifications of these traditional ones, appear to stretch legal
principles beyond their limits in order to meet policy justifications.
Other theories necessitate legislative action which, though possibly
more appropriate, require recognition of the problem by the legislature
and a well-reasoned, acceptable and workable solution. What solution
will ultimately be adopted is an open issue. Recently though, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided to provide its own answer.
IV. DECISION IN SINDELL V ABBOT L4BORATORIES
A. Rejection of Prior Non-Zdent'fable Manufacturers Theories
Before introducing its new theory, the Sindell court rejected the
relevance of alternative liability, concert action, and industry-wide lia-
bility theories to the situation. Alternative liability was rejected first
because all DES manufacturers were not joined as defendants, and,
second, because the defendants were in no better position to prove cau-
sation the plaintiffs than were.97 Concert action was not appropriate
because the formula for DES is a scientific constant and therefore
could not be a basis for a common plan. In addition, the defendants'
reliance on each other's marketing and promotional techniques was a
common practice in the industry. To apply concert action to this situa-
tion would be extending the doctrine beyond its limits.98 Finally, in-
96. Id.
97. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. See note 24supra and accompa-
nying text.
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dustry-wide liability was rejected for several reasons. First, the
blasting cap industry in Hall was much smaller than the drug industry.
The Hall court itself noted that this theory, readily applicable to a
small centralized industry, might be manifestly unreasonable when ap-
plied to a large decentralized industry.99 Second, in Hall, some of the
responsibility for the industry's safety standards was delegated to a
trade association. Such allegations were not made in the present
case. 0 Finally, the drug industry safety standards were set to a large
degree by the FDA. Therefore, it would be unfair to hold a manufac-
turer liable for injuries resulting from a drug supplied by another man-
ufacturer simply because it followed standards set by government
regulation.' Thus, the Hall theory of liability was not applicable to
the situation.
B. Policy Considerations
There were policy considerations, however, which justified finding
a valid cause of action. To begin, modem industry has developed fun-
gible goods which may injure consumers, but specific manufacturers
may not be identifiable. Consequently, a modification of the tradi-
tional products liability action was required.0 2 The court also noted
that the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized a modification of the
Summers rule might be necessary because of the lapse of time and be-
cause of other complications resulting from the failure to join all possi-
ble defendants. 03 An additional policy argument advanced by the
court was that the manufacturers were in the best position to absorb the
99. See note 69 supra.
100. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
101. Id. See also note 7 supra.
102. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court compared its reasoning to
that used by Justice Traynor to support a products liability action different from traditional negli-
gence. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-45 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
103. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court was referring to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment h (1965), which states:
The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in subsection (3) has been applied all
have been cases in which all of the actors involved have been joined as defendants. ...
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modificiation of the rule stated may be
necessary because of complications arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is
not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of time, or
because of substantial differences in the character of the conduct of the actors or the risks
which they have created.
[Vol. 16:286
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cost of the injury."° Relatedly, it was asserted that manufacturers were
better able to guard against the infusion if defective products into the
market and that to impose liability would provide incentive for greater
product safety. 1 5 The court finally noted that the most compelling rea-
son for finding a cause of action was that the negligent defendant rather
than the innocent plaintiff should bear the loss. '06 These goals could be
accomplished under the new theory of market share liability.
C. Market Share Liability
The Sindell court found that although the rule of Summers was
inapplicable as traditionally applied, 0 7 a modification of that theory
would be appropriate. The plaintiff was required to allege the existence
of a defect and an injury caused by that defect. 108 Causation though,
was not measured by the number of defendant manufacturers joined in
relation to the total number of manufacturers of that product. The
court stated that the appropriate measurement of the possibility that
any of the named defendants supplied the injury-causing product was
"the percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of
preventing miscarriage [bore] to the entire production of the drug sold
by all for that purpose."'" Therefore, once the plaintiff has shown that
the defendants joined in the action were manufacturers who together
produced a substantial portion 10 of the DES mothers may have taken,
the burden of proof shifted to the defendants to prove that they did not
manufacture the product which caused the injuries. The defendants
also had the option of cross-complaining against other manufacturers
104. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. See note 16 supra and accompa-
nying text. But see note 126 infra and accompanying text.
105. Id. The court emphasized that the consumer was particularly helpless to protect himself
against serious injury when drugs were involved. Accord, Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, and Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
The dissent pointed out that the social benefits of drug production outweighed the medically
recognizable risk in the use of drugs. Therefore, the additional risk should not be used to justify
liability. 26 Cal. 3d at 619, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
106. The court pointed out that although the defendants were in no better position than the
plaintiffs to prove causation, their conduct in marketing a drug with delayed effects significantly
contributed to the lack of proof. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
107. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
108. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
109. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Plaintiff alleged that Eli Lilly
and Co. along with five or six other manufacturers produced ninety percent of the DES marketed.
110. The court stated that while 75% to 80% was recommended, it would require only an
undefined "substantial share". Id. (citing Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 996.)
1980]
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who may have supplied the product which caused the injury. Appor-
tionment of damages was based on the share of the market for which
each defendant was responsible.'11
The court recognized that each defendant's share of the damages
may differ somewhat from its actual share of the market since all man-
ufacturers of the product might not be included and that determining
the market share of each defendant might be difficult in itself.' 12 This
would not invalidate the theory according to the court. Similar
problems were encountered and handled adequately with comparative
fault." 3 In addition, difficulties in determining market share were
problems of proof not pleading.' 14 Rejecting the defendants' argument
that it would be unfair to hold them liable for damages caused by an-
other's product, the court pointed out that with market share liability,
each defendant would only be liable for the amount equivalent to the
damages caused by the DES it manufactured."'
111. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
112. The defendants argued that there were no production figures available to determine mar-
ket share, that DES was produced for uses other than miscarriage prevention so that it would be
difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the drug produced went toward that use, and that it
would be difficult to establish a time frame and area for market share. These problems would be
further complicated since it was likely that some of the drug companies that produced DES during
the 1960's and 1970's were defunct. The problem in determining market share on an equitable
basis is demonstrated by the following example. A court, using whatever data is available, might
determine that a particular defendant produced 30% of the total market and is therefore liable for
30% of the plaintiffs damages. If actual figures and a definite time frame were available, along
with the production figures of now-defunct companies, it could be ascertained that the defendant
produced perhaps only 15% of the injury causing product market. Therefore, the amount of his
liability would be twice the amount of damage proportionately attributable to his product. Con-
versely, a defendant found to have produced only 15% of the total market might have, in actuality,
produced 30% of the drug supply to which the plaintiffs injuries are attributable. He would, then,
be held liable for only one half of the injuries caused by his product. Id. at 613 n.29, 607 P.2d at
937 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.29.
113. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. One criticism of comparative negli-
gence is the difficulty of apportioning damages among multiple tortfeasors. To provide an ade-
quate percentage of fault for each tortfeasor was perhaps outside the capability of the jury.
Comparative fault, regardless of its inaccuracy, was preferred over contributory negligence which
completely barred the plaintifrs suit. See generally Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L.
REv. 465, 503-07 (1953). The market share theory may suffer from the same problems due to the
lack of adequate statistics. The jury may be overwhelmed by contradicting statistical evidence
and in frustration arbitrarily decide percentages. This could result in more than a slight discrep-
ancy between one defendant's market share and the amount of damages it pays. This defect can
be remedied by trying the case before a judge or by the argument that to abandon market share
would leave the plaintiff without a remedy.
114. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. (citing Enterprise Liability,
supra note 7, at 994, for an explanation of the correction between market share and liability).
115. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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V. ANALYSIS
Technological advances in industry have created societal
problems. In addition to benefits, the development of new products
carries commensurate risks. Discoverable or patent risks are usually
dealt with by redesign or additional safety features. Products with
known or suspected latent risks carry warning labels. Some latent
risks, however, may only surface after a long period of time. In this
situation, when the product is put into the marketplace, there is no way
to warn the consumer of the hidden danger, or any reason to warrant
re-design or to prevent the marketing of the product. Nevertheless,
someone is injured. The allocation of responsibility for those injuries
and how the injured parties are to be compensated are issues that need
to be addressed.
The DES situation is a perfect example of the problem. The plain-
tiffs were injured by a drug taken by their mothers while the plaintiffs
were in utero. Though the drug had passed scrutiny under the avail-
able testing standards and procedures required at the initial marketing
point, it contained a defect which did not surface until twenty years
later and in the next generation of offspring. Because of the passage of
time, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants could prove who manu-
factured the particular drug that caused the injuries. The California
Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories'16 decided that the
courts were the appropriate body to determine the placement of re-
sponsibility and its allocation. ' 7 The court treated the problem as an
adversarial one-the consumer against the manufacturer. In reality,
because the problem is a societal one, the interests of society would best
be served by a solution amenable to both parties, one which a legisla-
ture would appear more fit to tailor than a court.
There are certain factors which should dictate that legislative con-
cern be focused on this problem. The first factor is that the solution to
the problem will have a profound effect on the current economic struc-
116. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (4-3 decision) (appeal pending).
117. The dissent pointed out that the legislature was currently reviewing California products
liability and was, in particular, considering legislation, (S. 1392 (1979-80) Reg. Sess. ch. 776
(1980)), which would provide funds for aiding persons exposed to DES. 26 Cal. 3d at 621, 607
P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
The majority rejected the applicability of the legislative measures to the case by stating that
the issue was the amount of "damages for injuries which have been or will be suffered." Nor, as a
principle do we see any justification for shifting the financial burden for such damages from drug
manufacturers to the taxpayers of California. Id. at 613 & n.30, 607 P.2d at 938 & n.30, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 146 & n.30.
1980]
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ture. lI8 The Sindell decision basically establishes a no-fault system of
compensation. The manufacturers are not being held liable because
they were negligent, either as individuals or in concert toward the
plaintiffs." 9 Nor are they liable because the inability to prove identifi-
cation was their fault,' or their particular product caused the plain-
tifis injuries. These facts cannot be proven.' 2  The manufacturers are
held liable because they happen to manufacture the same product. The
court rejects this as a basis for finding concert action liability, 22 but
nevertheless uses it as a foundation for its market share theory. This, in
effect, makes each manufacturer of a fungible product an insurer of not
only injuries caused by the particular product it produced, but also
those caused by similar products of other manufacturers.123 As a result,
insurance premiums for manufacturing are likely to increase or manu-
facturers will "capture" an insurance company to meet the demands of
the increased scope of liability. Larger companies will probably be
able to cope with these results. The smaller ones, however, might find
the cost of premiums outside their reach.'2 4  This would leave them
vulnerable to potentially devastating lawsuits. 2 1 In addition, since one
118. The effects of extended products liability are already being felt in the insurance area. See
note 83 supra.
119. See notes 20 & 42 supra and accompanying text.
120. 26 Cal. 3d at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138. To support their allegation that
the lack of evidence was the defendants' fault the plaintiffs relied on Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3
Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970). The court distinguished Haft, however, by
noting that in Haft a direct causal relationship was found between the drowning of a father and
son and the defendants' failure to provide lifeguards for their swimming pool. No direct and
foreseeable relationship exists in the present case, however. The court stated that it would be mere
speculation to find that had defendants provided a warning label, the plaintifis mother would
have recalled information concerning the drug she took and relayed it to her daughter. Id. at 601
n.14, 607 P.2d at 930 n.14, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.14.
121. Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
122. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
123. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1011-12. This result is contrary to the position
stated by the courts. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
The Sindell court counters this argument by noting that each manufacturer will be liable only
for injuries caused by their share of the market. But even the court recognized that the final
determination would not be accurate. 26 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Logically, the market share standard would be most easily satisfied by suing the larger manufac-
turers. Thus, it is conceivable that they could be held liable for 100% of the injuries caused by the
industry as a whole. Arguably this result is not unfair since they would probably have the greatest
influence on the industry.
124. See note 83 supra. See also INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY: FI-
NAL REPORT, reprinted in 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 585 app. (1978)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
125. It could be argued that, in view of the cost of high risk ventures, the solution for small
businesses would be to exercise extreme caution in the activities they choose to participate in.
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of the theoretical foundations of Sindell is that the manufacturer can
best distribute the loss among many, it is logical that this will result in
higher prices to the consumer. 126 In a competitive market, the large
manufacturers will be able to place prices at a more competitively ad-
vantageous level. Smaller manufacturers whose operational costs do
not have the benefit of high volume, will not. As a result, the smaller
manufacturer may be forced out of business.'27 Judicial imposition of
liability, with attendantly high awards, may discourage the production
of new products and affect marketing practices of the drug industry. 1
28
Finally, other areas as well as product safety might decrease instead of
increase since no matter how safely a manufacturer produces a product
it may still be held liable for unpreventable injuries or other manufac-
turers' careless manufacturing techniques.1
29
Another indication that a judicial solution such as market share
This, however, reserves the profit opportunities associated with high risk products to large manu-
facturers and consequently may result in monopolistic markets.
126. The ability of the manufacturer to pass on cost of increased insurance premiums to the
consumer depends on the type of product. The drug industry can easily pass on costs through
price increases. Other manufacturers may not be able to pass on costs because a large portion of
the increase in insurance costs is due to older products. In order to be competitive with newer
companies who do not have much risks, they have to maintain price levels. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 124, at 984-85.
Since it is ultimately the consumer to pays, a more realistic approach would be to take a
portion of the sales price of each product and set it aside for compensation of product-caused
injuries. See Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1019-22 (proposing a system of latent tech-
nological injury compensation which would use funds procured through a tax on the manufactur-
ers' gross sales).
127. The Task Force was unable to obtain verifable statistics on the number of small busi-
nesses which terminated either because of increased insurance premiums or unsatisified products
liability judgments. It found, however, the circumstantial evidence suggested that this problem
existed. FINAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 990-94.
128. Extended products liability may have an effect on the production of new products. The
Task Force found, however, that further study was needed to determine the extent of the impact.
One area where the impact was clearly shown was the drug industry. The Swine Flu program was
almost barred because the pharmaceutical companies refused to provide the vaccine as a result of
their inability to obtain adequate products liability insurance. Evaluation of this situation lead the
Task Force to state: "To the extent that companies manufacturing pharmaceuticals and medical
devices are unable to obtain affordable product liability coverage for their new products, ...
there may be an adverse impact upon medical research and upon the development and marketing
of new products which may be socially beneficial." FINAL REPORT, supra note 124, at 988-89.
129. Industry-Wide Liability, supra note 18, at 1003-04. Conversely, imposing liability could
encourage effective use of the drug industry's post-marketing system for adverse reactions and
result in increased injury prevention. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 1004-05. Arguably,
any delay in the marketing of products attributable to extensive testing to avoid potential liability
could result in a safer product. This argument has minimal validity, however, when the product,
as in the case of DES or asbestos, has a defect that is not discoverable for ten years or more.
Conventional scientific testing is ineffective with respect to such drugs. With drugs, the social
benefits supporting expedient marketing practices may often outweigh whatever risk remains un-
defined after thorough testing.
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liability is not as feasible as a legislative remedy is the degree of extra-
polation the Sindell court had to engage in to justify its decision. The
court found no prior legal basis for its new theory. Therefore, a policy
justification was the only alternative. The court first noted that the ad-
vances in technology created the problem caused by fungible goods
and that the court had a choice-to maintain the current doctrine and
deny the plaintiff a remedy, or fashion a new remedy to meet the situa-
tion. Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. was cited as support. 130 The court noted that, while
Justice Traynor was referring to duty, the court's present problem was
causation and liability.' 3' Though in some state of confusion, the prin-
ciple of foreseeability still plays a role in California products liability
law. 132 The adaptation the court was trying to justify was the complete
elimination of foreseeability as a relevant factor. The drug had passed
all available tests.' 33 The defect surfaced a generation later. No manu-
facturer could have discerned that. Therefore, it can hardly be said
that the injury was foreseeable.
The court also advanced the Restatement (Second) of Torts as sup-
port. Specifically, it pointed to section 433B, Comment h, which states
that the rule in Summers may need modification if all defendants can-
not be joined or due to the effect of lapse of time.' 34 Although the com-
ment declines to forecast the type of cases in which modification would
130. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 152 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944).
131. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
132. Manufacturers, or more specifically drug manufacturers, may be held liable under vari-
ous theories of negligence, implied warranties, or strict liability. 50 CAL. JUR. 3d § 43 (1980). The
California courts have eliminated the unreasonably dangerous standard of Reslatement (Second)
ofTorts § 402A as the standard for strict liability on the grounds that it was too close to a negli-
gence standard. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), the court defined a design defect two ways. The first was based on the expectations of the
consumer when the product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. The second involved
balancing the benefits of the challenged design against the risk of danger inherent in the design.
The latter standard was proposed to eliminate the role of fault in strict liability. Id. at 432, 573
P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. Thus, the court sought to eliminate negligence principles,
including forseeability, from strict products liability. However, the court appeared to retreat from
this trend in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978) when the court extended comparative fault to strict liability cases. See generally California
Perspective, supra note 89, for a discussion of the California dichotomy. The conflict seems to be
embodied in the respective opinions of Justices Mosk and Richardson. Justice Mosk's majority
opinion in Sindell case and his dissent in Day favor the trend toward no-fault compensation
based strict liability. Justice Richardson in his majority opinion in Daiy and his dissent in Sindell
favors an unwillingness to depart totally from fault-based liability.
133. 26 Cal. 3d at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Contra, Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 963-71 (testing methods were insufficient).
134. See note 104 supra.
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be necessary, it is conceivable that this situation was not one of them.
In Summers all possible defendants were joined. It was entirely certain
that one of the defendants was responsible. By joining less than the
total number of defendants, the basis for liability under the Summers
rule is weakened considerably. This weakness was recognized under
the enterprise liability theory which also used the market share concept.
Enterprise liability minimized the defect by requiring that the plaintiff
also prove adherence to an insufficient industry-wide safety stan-
dard. 35
The court's next and "most persuasive" reason for allowing the
cause of action was that as between an innocent plaintiff and a negli-
gent defendant, the tortfeasor should bear the loss. 13 6 Nevertheless,
this is unpersuasive when it is remembered that the court found that
neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were at fault for lack of proof as
to identification.'37 The court tried to rationalize their decision by not-
ing that the defendants contributed to the problem by marketing a drug
with delayed effects.' 38 This argument is untenable when it is consid-
ered that the defect was not discoverable under the contemporary test-
ing methods. To use this justification as a basis of finding some fault is
to require manufacturers to be clairvoyant.139
Realizing that these reasons were not sufficient, the court pro-
ceeded to broader policy arguments. The first justification advanced
was the "deep pocket" theory-the defendants were best able to bear
the loss and distribute it among society. Though this is probably true,
as the dissent notes wealth should not be a basis for liability."4 ' Fur-
135. Enterprise Liability, supra note 7, at 997.
136. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
137. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
139. The dissent noted that over 99% of DES daughters never developed cancer. It went on to
argue:
If a drug has beneficial purposes for the majority of users but harmful side effects are
later revealed for a small fraction of consumers, will the manufacturer be absolutely
liable? If adverse consequences, wholly unknown to the most careful and meticulous of
present scientists, surface in two or three generations, will similar liability be imposed?
.. [C]ommon sense and reality combine to warn that a "market share" theory goes too
far. Legally, it expects too much.
Id. at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
140. Justice Richardson noted:
This "deep pocket" theory of liability, . . .has understandable popular appeal and
might be tolerable in a case disclosing substantially stronger evidence of causation that
herein appears. But as a general rule, a defendant's wealth is an unreliable indicator of
fault, and should play no part, at least consciously, in the legal analysis of the prob-
lem .... A system priding itself on "equal justice under law" does not flower when the
liability as well as the damage aspect of a tort action is determined by a defendant's
19801
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thermore, the loss spreading rationale has its own dangers. 141 The sec-
ond justification for devising a new cause of action was that it would
encourage product safety, deter placement of defective products in the
marketplace, and, as a result, protect the helpless consumer. This ra-
tionale is based, however, if not on fault, then at least on the ground
that the defects were discoverable and could be prevented. 142 If the
consumer is helpless to protect himself from injuries caused by the
delayed effects of a drug with a latent defect, then the manufacturer is
also helpless in the sense that it cannot warn or take preventive meas-
ures against such a defect.
On these policy bases the court held that a plaintiff states a valid
cause of action when the injury is caused by a fungible product and the
plaintiff has joined defendants who have together contributed a sub-
stantial portion of the market for that product. Causation is to be mea-
sured by market share. But this crucial element is left undefined. The
court noted that joining defendants who have a combined market share
of seventy-five percent to eighty percent has been recommended, but
expressly declines to designate any percentage parameters. "43 Since
there is no basis for liability except the defendants' market share of a
fungible product, the court's failure to define this element is a critical
error. It is not merely a matter of proof as the majority suggests, but, as
the dissent points out, a question of liability.'" Moreover, the court
uses this uncertain element to justify shifting the burden of proof from
the plaintiff to the defendants on the issue of causation. 14 - The court
noted that any unfairness inherent in shifting the burden of proof is
minimized by holding each defendant liable only for its share of the
product. This logic is hard to accept. The court has recognized that the
defendants are in no better position to disprove causation than the
plaintiffs are of proving it.'46 A defendant who produced only thirty
percent of the total product marketed should not be held liable merely
wealth. The inevitable consequence of such a result is to create and perpetuate two rules
of law--one applicable to wealthy defendants, and another standard pertaining to de-
fendants who are poor or who have modest means.
Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
141. See note 88 supra.
142. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. See generally Californ/a Perspec.
tive, supra note 89, at 776-82.
143. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
144. Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
145. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This is not easily justified because the
shift in Summers was based on the fact that it was certain that plaintiffs harm was caused by one
of the joined defendants. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
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because he cannot prove that he did not market the specific product
that injured the plaintiff. Because most defendant's market share is rel-
atively small, it is more likely than not that a given defendant did not
market the product in question. To hold the defendant liable in such
circumstances is manifestly inequitable.
147
Finally, the uncertainty of the market share element is carried
through to the apportionment of damages. Rather than making the de-
fendants jointly and severally liable as in alternative liability, 4 ' the
court apportioned the damages each defendant will be liable for on the
basis of its market share. The court dismissed the problems caused by
this element's vagueness by pointing out that difficulty in apportion-
ment has been handled adequately in other situations.
149
With liability based, not on fault, but on production of similar
products, the end result of the court's decision is not a theory derived
from established legal principles, but a theory of no-fault compensation
founded on a basis of loss spreading and redistribution. As one com-
mentator noted, if redistribution is the major goal, then there is no rea-
son why the court should retain the principles of causation and defect.
Redistribution would be frustrated to the extent that the defendant
could use those elements to defeat the plaintifis cause of action. "If the
needs of the plaintiff are decisive, then the most appropriate response is
a comprehensive system of first party insurance that compensates each
person in accordance with the severity of their injury.' 150
It is possible that a uniform system of compensation is the solu-
tion to the problem. Courts resolve individual cases and cannot solve
the problems inherent in setting up a major compensation system.' 5 1
That responsibility belongs to a legislature which has the time and the
resources to make a proper evaluation of the problem and the possible
solutions. Unlike courts, which have been traditionally limited to deal-
ing with a problem on a case-by-case basis, the legislature is empow-
ered, through enactments, to make broader, more uniform changes.' 52
Legislative decisions do not rest on the arguments of a limited number
of parties concerning a particular fact situation. Considering the poten-
147. Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
148. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
149. See note 114 supra.
150. Epstein, rupra note 88, at 659.
151. Id. at 661. The criticism that the courts have become a secondary legislature has reached
the United States Supreme Court. E.g., R. BURGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
152. Some legislative steps taken have included statute of limitations and statutes of repose.
See Buchanan, supra note 93, at 816-83.
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tial breadth of the fungible products problem, such a decisional basis is
too narrow. By shifting the problem to the legislature, consumer
groups as well as manufacturers will have a role in the final plan. The
legislature might react more slowly than courts in reaching its decision,
and during the decisional process persons will probably suffer from in-
juries caused by fungible products. In the long run, however, a legisla-
tive decision will be more equitable and will reflect the needs of many
interest groups. It will also avoid the undermining of judicial princi-
ples which have served well in other situations.1 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Advanced technology has created not only new products, but also
new problems. One of these problems is the inability of a plaintiff in-
jured by a fungible product containing a latent defect to identify the
manufacturer of the product which caused his injury as required by
traditional tort law. The problem is not only one of lack of identifica-
tion, but also lack of fault because the manufacturer could not have
discovered the defect under the current methods of testing. The court in
Sindell attempted to solve the problem by judicially devising a basis of
no-fault compensation. However, considering the scope of the problem
and the role of the courts, the solution to the situation rests more ap-
propriately with the legislature. This body, by providing a forum in
which the concerns of all interested parties can be voiced, can devise an
equitable and uniform solution without doing violence to valuable le-
gal principles. Though it is recommended that the Sindell theory not
be accepted as a viable cause of action, it is hoped that the legislatures
will see it as a warning that the problem has reached maturity and re-
quires immediate attention.
Barbara Banker Redemann
153. Epstein, supra note 89, at 661.
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